On the role of heuristics: experimental evidence on inflation dynamics
In: Passauer Diskussionspapiere
In: V, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe Diskussionsbeitr. Nr. V-63-11
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In: Passauer Diskussionspapiere
In: V, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe Diskussionsbeitr. Nr. V-63-11
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In: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe Nr. V-61-10
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In: V, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe Diskussionsbeitr. Nr. V-60-10
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In: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 57
In: Paperback re-issue
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In: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 51
We let students play a corruption game, embedded into a variant of the ultimatum game. Those allotted the role of public servants chose between whistleblowing, opportunism and reciprocity by delivery (of a contract) and those acting as businesspeople chose how to frame the game and whether to blow the whistle. While opportunism and abstaining from whistleblowing is the Nash equilibrium, another likely outcome was that businesspeople allocate resources to punishing public servants for non-delivery, exhibiting a preference for negative reciprocity. Anticipating this, public servants might tend to reciprocate or blow the whistle upfront. Female public servants were more inclined to behave opportunistically; female businesspeople were less engaged in negative reciprocity. This corroborates a favorable role of women in anticorruption. Businesspeople who strongly preferred a corrupt framing of the game and obtained a form with corrupt wording were more willing to punish non-delivering public servants. This operates against camouflaging a bribe as a gift, because gifts fail to signal negative reciprocity. -- Corruption ; ultimatum game ; whistleblowing ; gender ; signaling ; trust
In: CeGE discussion paper 59
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In: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 06,44
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In: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 41
Corrupt arrangements are characterized by a high risk of opportunism. Moreover, denunciation and extortion add another layer of uncertainty for participants in corrupt transactions. This paper demonstrates how legislators can use an asymmetric design of criminal sanctions to amplify these inherent risks, thereby destabilizing corrupt arrangements. It is also shown that asymmetric penalties do not necessarily interfere with the goal of deterrence and that immunity may be a useful tool to disband the "pact of silence" characteristic of corrupt arrangements. -- Corruption ; Asymmetric Sanctions ; Destabilization ; Opportunism ; Denunciation ; Immunity
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In: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 05,34
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In: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe 05,31
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In: V, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe Diskussionsbeitrag 38
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In: V, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe Diskussionsbeitr. 28
In: Diskussionsbeiträge aus dem Volkswirtschaftlichen Seminar der Universität Göttingen 94